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Item non-response in household survey data on economic variables such as income, 
assets or consumption is a well-known problem. Follow-up unfolding bracket questions 
have been used as a tool to collect partial information on respondents that do not answer 
an open-ended question. It is also known, however, that mistakes are made in answering 
such unfolding bracket questions. In this paper, we develop several limited dependent 
variable models to analyze two sources of mistakes, anchoring and acquiescence (or yea-
saying), focusing on the first bracket question. We use the experimental module of the 
AHEAD 1995 data, where the sample is randomly split into respondents who get an 
open-ended question on the amount of total family consumption - with follow-up 
unfolding brackets (of the form: is consumption $X or more?) for those who answer 
“don’t know” or “refuse” - and respondents who are immediately directed to unfolding 
brackets. In both cases, the entry point of the unfolding bracket sequence is randomized. 
We compare models in which the probability of a mistake depends on the deviation 
between the true consumption amount and the entry point amount $X and models in 
which it does not. We find that allowing for acquiescence bias substantially changes the 
conclusions on the selective nature of non-response to the open-ended question and on 
the distribution of consumption expenditures in the population. Once acquiescence bias is 
taken into account, anchoring in the first bracket question plays only a minor role.     
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1. Introduction 
  Item non-response in survey data on variables of interest to economists is a well-
known problem, particularly if questions relate to sensitive information that respondents 
are not willing to provide or to information that respondents do not know exactly and find 
hard to estimate.  Examples are the amounts invested in saving accounts or the value of 
assets such as stocks and bonds, or the value of total family income or consumption. Item 
non-response becomes particularly problematic if the information is not missing at 
random, i.e., if the probability of not responding correlates with the amount in question. 
See, for example, Manski (1989) and Little and Rubin (2002, Chapter 15). 
  Follow-up bracket questions are often used to reduce the loss of information due 
to item non-response and to extract at least partial information from initial non-
respondents. See, for example, Juster and Smith (1997). Particularly in telephone 
interviews where it is difficult to show range cards or to let people choose in one step 
from a larger number of categories, unfolding brackets can be used to collect banded 
information. For example, a respondent who answers “don’t know” or “refuse” to a 
question on total family consumption in the past month then gets the question “Can you 
say whether it was $2000 or more?” If the answer is affirmative, the next question is 
“Was it $5000 or more?” etc. 
  The majority of initial non-respondents typically appear to be willing to answer 
one or more unfolding bracket questions, making unfolding brackets a useful tool to 
collect additional information. Several experiments, however, have shown that the 
distribution of the categorical answers obtained in an unfolding bracket design depends 
on the order in which the bracket points are presented. For example, if the first question is 
“Was it $ 2000 or more?” i.e., the entry point is $2000, the distribution gives more weight 
to the high consumption outcomes than if the entry point were $500. A psychological 
explanation is that if people are unsure about the exact amount, the entry point will serve 
as an anchor that provides information about their own amount. This phenomenon is 
known as anchoring (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
  The literature shows that anchoring exists and becomes more prominent the more 
uncertain the respondent is about the exact answer (see, for example, Jacowitz and 
Kahneman, 1995). In order to use the answers to unfolding bracket questions for   3
meaningful economic analysis, the possibility of an anchoring bias needs to be taken into 
account. Several models for what the answers to bracket questions look like if they suffer 
from anchoring have been introduced and estimated, using different sources of 
experimental data with random entry points. Examples are Hurd et al. (1998), Herriges 
and Shogren (1996), and Cameron and Quiggin (1994). A comparison between 
competing models for anchoring, however, has not yet been performed.  
Another problem that leads to incorrect answers in an unfolding bracket design is 
acquiescence or “yea- saying” This is the problem that people have a tendency to answer 
yes rather than no. See, for example, Holmes and Kramer (1995), Kanninen (1995) and 
Hurd (1999). It implies that answers may depend on the wording of the question. For 
example, the number of “yes” answers to the question “Was it 2000 or more?” will be 
higher than the number of “no” answers to the question “Was it less than 2000?” 
  In this paper, several models for anchoring and acquiescence are estimated using 
experimental data on household consumption from the AHEAD 1995 survey. The 
specific feature of these data is that the sample is randomly split in respondents that start 
with an open-ended question - and get follow-up brackets if they do not answer the open-
ended question - and a sub-sample of respondents who are immediately directed to the 
unfolding bracket questions without being asked an open-ended question (see Hurd et al., 
1998). In a companion paper, we have combined the data from the two sub-samples to 
construct a non-parametric test for the null hypothesis that the first bracket question is 
always answered correctly (van Soest and Hurd, 2003). This hypothesis is rejected. 
Incorporating  simple acquiescence and anchoring probabilities that do not depend on the 
difference between the true amount and the entry point suggests that, for the first bracket 
question, acquiescence is a larger problem than anchoring.   
  In the current paper, we develop limited dependent variable models with more 
flexible forms of anchoring and acquiescence, accounting for the fact that the 
probabilities of anchoring and yea-saying mistakes fall with the distance between the 
entry point and the true amount, in line with the notion that uncertainty is a source of 
anchoring and acquiescence. Our model consists of several equations. First, a regression 
equation explains the consumption level obtained through open-ended answers 
(sometimes observed, sometimes not), taking into account focal point answers. Second, a   4
selection equation explains whether an open-ended answer is given or not. Third, 
anchoring and acquiescence are modeled as functions of linear combinations of 
background variables and the difference between the entry point and the unobserved 
consumption level. The model is used to analyze how anchoring and acquiescence affect 
conclusions about the consumption function in the AHEAD population.        
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some 
existing models for anchoring are reviewed. In Section 3, we describe the experimental 
data. Section 4 introduces the limited dependent variable models. Estimation results and 
their implications are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Anchoring Models and Acquiescence Bias 
  An intuitively appealing anchoring model is the fixed-point model used by Hurd 
et al. (2001), Herriges and Shogren (1996), and O’Connor et al. (1999) in which the entry 
point E in the first bracket question serves as an anchor for follow-up questions. The 
fixed-point  model  can  be  interpreted  as  a  Bayesian model, where respondents update 
their beliefs about an unknown amount if new information (in the form of an entry point 
or other bracket point) arrives. The intuition is that the respondent is uncertain about the 
true amount. The entry point is seen as an indication of what the true amount could be, 
and respondents update their estimates of the true amount towards the entry point.  
  An important feature of the fixed-point model is that answers to the first bracket 
question are not affected.
2 The respondent’s estimate of the true amount will be drawn 
towards the entry point, but will remain on the same side. Thus if anchoring according to 
the fixed-point model were the only source of incorrect answers, answers to the first 
bracket question would always be correct.  Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) and Green 
et al. (1998) conclude that anchoring is already present in the first bracket question. They 
find  that,  if  a  high  entry  point  is  used,  respondents  too  often  report  that  the  amount 
exceeds that entry point. Jacowitz and Kahneman ask respondents’ estimates of objective 
quantities such as the length of the Mississippi river or the amount of gas used by an 
average  American.  They  compare  immediate  open-ended  answers  with  open-ended 
                                                 
2 This is why Hurd et al. (2001) call it a fixed-point model: the transformation from unbiased to biased 
probability has a fixed point at the entry point.   5
answers of a group that first got a question on whether the amount was higher or lower 
than some anchor value. They find that high as well as low anchors pull the amount 
toward the anchor, which can be explained by the fixed-point anchoring model. They also 
find,  however,  that  when  high  anchors  are  used  the  amount  is  sometimes  pulled  up 
beyond the anchor. Green et al. (1998) look at willingness to pay for public goods as well 
as  objective  quantities,  using  a  similar  design.  Their  main  result  is  in  line  with  the 
Jacowitz and Kahneman finding: “The proportion of respondents who accept a high value 
in the referendum question is larger than the proportion of respondents who offer the 
same value on their own in response to an open-ended question” (Green et al 1998, p. 
94). While the authors explain this type of finding with anchoring, the fact that the bias is 
found for high values only suggests that yea-saying might also play a role.   
  Hurd et al. (1998) specify a parametric model that captures this phenomenon in a 
symmetric way, biasing probabilities smaller than 0.5 upward and probabilities larger 
than 0.5 downward. The idea is that respondents do not compare the true value Y to the 
entry point E, but instead compare Y to E+e, where e is a mean zero error term, assumed 
to be normal and independent of all other variables in the model. Hurd et al. (1998) use 
the same device also at follow-up bracket questions, with question specific errors that are 
independent across questions and have a variance that can be different at each question in 
the unfolding bracket design. Their model is called a gating model, since respondents 
have to pass a number of gates to reach their final bracket answer. 
  Somewhat  similar,  though  not  (yet)  applied in this context, are the models of 
misclassification used in the applied micro-econometrics literature (e.g., Hausman et al., 
1998). Suppose that with some “fixed gating probability” P(Gat), people give the wrong 
answer.  This  implies  P[“no”]  =  P[Y<E](1-P(Gat))  +  P[Y³E]P(Gat)  and  P[“yes”]  = 
P[Y³E](1-P(Gat)) + P[Y<E]P(Gat). If this probability does not depend on the true value 
and is thus the same whether the true amount is larger or smaller than the entry point, this 
explains  that  fractions  of  reported  “yes”  or  “no”  answers  are  too  large  if  the 
corresponding population fraction is larger than 0.5 and too small if it is smaller than 0.5. 
  A direct test of acquiescence bias or “yea-saying” is performed by Hurd (1999). 
He  uses  experimental  data  from  the  1996  wave  of  the  Health  and Retirement Study. 
Respondents were asked: “About how much could you sell your home for in today’s   6
housing  market?”  They  were  forced  into  brackets  and  were  randomly  given  an entry 
point  from  a  set  of  three  (E=$50,000,  E=$100,000  or  E=$150,000).  They  also  got  a 
randomly assigned format of the question: either “Would it be more than E,” or “Would it 
be E or more?” or “Would it be less than E or more than E?” Hurd found that the first two 
(unbalanced) formats led to many more “yes” answers than the third (balanced) format 
for  non-financial  respondents,  while  there  was  hardly  any  difference  for  financial 
respondents (i.e., the person in the household most knowledgeable in financial matters). 
He interpreted this as evidence of acquiescence related to uncertainty. Acquiescence bias 
is also a well-known problem in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) literature. For example, 
Boyle  et  al.  (1998)  find  evidence  of  yea-saying  for  bid  levels  in  the  upper  tail  by 
comparing open-ended answers and bracket answers on the WTP for a moose hunting 
site. Holmes and Kramer (1995) compare independent samples of dichotomous choice 
answers and range card answers on willingness to pay for the protection of a specific 
forest  ecosystem  in  the  southern  Appalachian  Mountains.  They  find  significant 
differences in the WTP distributions estimated from range cards and dichotomous choice 
answers, but they do not find systematic differences in the way in which WTP varies with 
individual  characteristics.  Frykblom  and  Shogren  (2000)  used  experimental  data  to 
compare open-ended and discrete choice answers on students’ WTP for a specific book 
(“The Environment”) and found no differences, leading them to conclude that problems 
with discrete choice answers can be due to how the survey is framed rather than to the 
questions themselves. Kanninen (1995) introduces a fixed probability yea-saying model, 
with P[“yes”|Y(@  DQG 3>³\HV´_<(@   6KH HVWLPDWHV D \HD-VD\LQJ SUREDELOLW\  RI
0.20 (t-value 7.4) for a wetlands improvement program.             
 
3. The AHEAD Wave 2 Consumption Experiment 
  We use essentially the same data as Hurd et al. (1998), who describe the data in 
detail. The AHEAD panel (Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old) is 
roughly representative for the US population over 70 and their spouses. The first wave 
was collected in 1993. The second wave was done in 1995, mainly by telephone 
interviews. At the end of the regular survey, participants were asked to complete an   7
additional experimental module. About 75% of all respondents were willing to do this. 
This is the sample used by Hurd et al. (1998) and for the current study. 
  The participants in the experimental module were randomly separated into 7 
groups of approximately equal size. All these groups got some questions on total 
household consumption in the last month, but the question format differed across the 
groups.
3 Three groups (sample I) started with the open question: “How much did your 
household spend on consumption in the past month?”
4 Those who answered “don’t 
know” or “refuse” then got unfolding bracket questions, with different entry points for 
the three groups. The first unfolding bracket question was formulated as “Would the 
amount be $E or more in the past month?” with E=500, E=1000 or E=2000. If a 
respondent answered “don’t know” or “refuse” to a bracket question, the sequence was 
stopped. The other four groups (sample II) immediately were given bracket questions, 
with different entry points for the four groups ($500, $1000, $2000 and $5000). 
  The complete sample consists of 4928 observations. About 3.4% of them did not 
give an answer to either an open-ended question or a follow-up or direct bracket 
question;
5 these observations are discarded. This leaves 4760 observations.  About 42% 
of them (sample I; 2097 observations) started with an open-ended question. Almost two 
thirds of them gave an open-ended answer (1416 observations). The remaining one third 
gave at least one bracket answer. 
Figure 1 presents the empirical distribution function for the open-ended answers 
and the inferred cumulative distribution function for the follow-up bracket answers, 
separately for the three entry points. The difference between the distribution functions of 
open-ended answers and follow-up bracket answers suggests that open-ended answers 
tend to be lower, on average, than as suggested by the bracket-answers. Some of the 
differences are statistically significant. An explanation would be that high consumption 
                                                 
3 See Browning et al. (2002) for the usefulness of measuring total consumption expenditures and for an 
overview of advantages and drawbacks of an overall recall consumption question in household surveys.   
4 The exact wording of the question was: “About how much did you and your household spend on 
everything in the past month? Please think about all bills such as rent, mortgage loan payments, utility and 
other bills, as well as all expenses such as food, clothing, transportation, entertainment and any other 
expenses you and your household may have.” 
5 About 0.8% stopped the interview before attaining answering the consumption question and about 2.6% 
answered “don’t know” or “refuse” to the first bracket question. See the appendix of van Soest and Hurd 
(2003) for details.   8
families are more concerned about their privacy and less willing to give a precise 
number, i.e., open-ended answers could under-represent high amounts (negative selection 
into open answers; positive selection into follow-up brackets). Alternatively, respondents 
could make mistakes in their open-ended answers or their bracket answers (or both). In 
particular, the differences between the distributions of bracket responses for the three 
entry points suggest that some bracket answers may depend on the (randomly assigned) 
entry point, which could be explained by fixed-point anchoring. 
  Figure 2 shows the distributions for the immediate bracket respondents by entry 
point, together with the distribution of open-ended answers already described in Figure 1. 
Again, negative selection into open-ended answers might explain why the open-ended 
answers tend to be small compared to the bracket responses. A salient feature of this 
figure is that the distribution shifts with the entry point. In this case the numbers of 
observations are larger than in Figure 1 and most of the differences are significant. The 
anchoring models in the previous section provide explanations for these differences. 
There seems to be common agreement in the literature that fixed-point anchoring 
biases the answers to the second and later bracket questions. The entry point in the first 
bracket question acts as an anchor and the respondent’s estimate is pulled towards it. In 
this paper we focus on problems with answers to the first bracket question, which cannot 
be due to fixed-point anchoring. We do not use the answers to the later bracket questions, 
thus avoiding the need to deal with fixed-point anchoring in the analysis. 
Figure 3 uses the answers to the first bracket question only to estimate the 
distribution for the sample of immediate bracket respondents as well as the sample of 
follow-up bracket respondents. It takes the information on entry point bracket answers 
from Figures 1 and 2 and combines it. For example, for the immediate bracket 
respondents, the fraction of households with consumption less than $2000 is based upon 
the group of immediate respondents who got $2000 as their entry point. This is the point 
(20,0.701) on the dash-dotted curve in Figure 2. Similarly, the fraction of households 
with consumption less than $1000 is based upon the sub-sample of immediate bracket 
respondents with entry point $1000, etc.            
The three distributions in Figure 3 will differ if non-response to the open-ended 
question is non-random. Taking the reports at face value, 81.0% of those in sample I who   9
gave an open-ended response have consumption less than $2000, compared to 75.1% of 
those who gave a follow-up bracket answer. Even if all reports are correct, there is no 
reason why these two numbers should be estimates of the same thing, since whether or 
not a respondent gives an open answer may well be correlated with the level of household 
consumption (a selection effect).  
The immediate bracket responses are, because of the random assignment, drawn 
from the same population as the combined sample of open-ended and follow-up bracket 
respondents. This implies that, if all answers to open-ended questions and first bracket 
questions are correct, the distribution of immediate bracket respondents should be a 
weighted mean of the other two distributions. The figure suggests this is not the case. 
In van Soest and Hurd (2003), a formal test is developed based upon this intuition 
that looks at differences at several entry points. The null hypothesis that all answers are 
correct is rejected. Van Soest and Hurd (2003) also incorporate a simple form of gating 
and acquiescence bias, using “fixed” probabilities of acquiescence and gating, i.e., 
probabilities that do not depend on the difference between the true amount and the 
amount in the question. First, they assume that there is a fixed probability P(Acq) that a 
bracket question is automatically answered with “yes” (as in Kanninen 1995). Second, if 
there is no such automatic “yes,” they assume that there is a fixed probability P(Gat) that 
people give the wrong answer (“yes” if Y<E or “no” if Y E). With these two additions to 
the nonparametric model, the probability that someone answers “yes” if the true 
consumption amount is less than E, is given by P(Acq) + (1-P(Acq))P(Gat). The 
probability that someone answers “no” if the true amount is at least E, is given by (1-
P(Acq))P(Gat). Hurd and van Soest (2003) find that acquiescence is more important than 
gating: the estimate of the gating probability is 0.018 with standard error 0.039, while the 
acquiescence probability is 0.170 with standard error 0.037. 
  To check whether a fixed acquiescence probability is reasonable, we have 
repeated the analysis for sub-samples with different household income levels.
6  If 
acquiescence and gating depend on the (absolute value of) the difference between the 
                                                 
6 We have used the household net income variable in the RAND version of the HRS, which uses a 
sophisticated imputation procedure to replace missing values of income components, so that an income 
value is available for almost the complete sample.   
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entry point and the true amount, we should see a smaller bias for those respondents 
whose true consumption is unlikely to be close to the entry point. Estimating the 
unrestricted model for groups with different income levels shows that this is indeed the 
case. For example, we compared the estimates of P[Y<1000] based upon samples I and II  
separately for those with income between the first and third income quartile and for those 
with income below the first or above the third income quartile. The second and third 
income quartile households lead to estimates 0.480 and 0.376 for samples I and II; the 
first and fourth income quartile households give estimates 0.504 and 0.463. The 
difference is significant in the first case but not in the second. This suggests that 
acquiescence bias is more prominent in the sample where many consumption values are 
close to the entry point (E=1000), and argues against using a model with a fixed 
acquiescence probability.          
 
Explanatory Variables 
Due to missing values on years of education and self-reported memory skills, two 
observations had to be discarded. Thus the estimation results will be based upon 4758 
observations. The demographic variables included in the analysis are summarized in 
Table 1. 
  The financial respondent dummy is included since financial respondents might be 
less uncertain about the household’s total consumption than non-financial respondents. 
On the other hand, marital status (and household size)
7 will probably affect the household 
consumption level, but not response behavior. Age can affect the consumption level but 
might also act as a proxy for cognitive skills. Gender might influence consumption, but 
the tendency not to respond to the open question or to give an incorrect answer to a 
bracket question might also be gender specific. Years of education may serve as a proxy 
for human capital wealth and for cognitive skills or knowledge of financial household 
matters in the other equations. 
Dummies for whether the respondent smokes or drinks alcohol may proxy 
individual discount rates and attitudes towards savings and consumption. They may also, 
                                                 
7 In this data set of elderly respondents, household size and marital status are strongly correlated. Including 
them as separate regressors did not lead to sensible results. We therefore do not include household size.   11
more in general, proxy attitudes towards life related to financial knowledge and/or 
privacy concerns, and thus may affect response behavior and the sensitivity to anchoring 
or acquiescence bias. The AHEAD data contain two direct measures of memory skills. 
The first is based upon a self-report on how good the respondent’s memory is these days. 
The second is the result of a test in which a list of 40 words is read to the respondent, 
who is then asked to reproduce as many of these words as possible. These variables can 
have an influence on response behavior and on anchoring or acquiescence errors. 
Household income is constructed from income with many missing values. 
Excluding the observations with missing values would reduce the sample size by more 
than 50%. Instead, we use the RAND version of the data where missing values have been 
replaced by imputations. This induces measurement error, however, which will bias the 
income elasticity towards zero. To account for this, we replace log income by its 
prediction on the basis of lagged income and all the exogenous variables. This will lead 
to consistent estimates if the deviation between the predicted and the true (log) income 
variable is normally distributed and independent of the regressors, and if measurement 
errors in lagged and current income are independent.  Since the imputations of missing 
values do not make use of lagged information, the latter assumption seems reasonable as 
far as imputation error is concerned. If respondents persistently over- or underestimate 
their income in different time periods, then our consumption elasticity will still be biased 
towards zero, but less than when the original income variable were used at face value. 
For wealth, a similar problem arises. In the regressions we include lagged wealth, 
since current wealth may be affected by consumption decisions. Because the data are 
from the second wave, this leaves no further lags to be used as instruments. We therefore 
use the same instruments as for income to predict the log of lagged wealth.
8   
                                                 
8 In principle it would also be possible to use income and wealth from later waves. Due to panel attrition, 
however, this would substantially reduce the number of observations that can be used.     12
Table 1. Background Characteristics (4758 observations) 
 
Variable  Description         Mean      Std. Dev. 
 
Dfinr   1 if financial respondent,     0.745    0.436 
    0 otherwise 
Dman    1 if man, 0 if woman       0.346    0.476 
 
Birthyr  Year of birth – 1900      17.905    6.242 
 
Yrs educ  Years of education        11.410    3.398 
 
Nonwhite  0 if white (and not Hispanic);   0.165    0.371  
1 otherwise     
Catholic  1 if of catholic religion;     0.244    0.429 
0 otherwise 
Other rel  1 if neither catholic nor     0.102    0.303 
    Protestant; 0 otherwise 
Marrlt  1 if married or living together;   0.552    0.497 
    0 otherwise 
Dsmoke  Dummy smoker         0.089    0.284          
   
Ddrink  Dummy drinks alcohol       0.425    0.494 
Self_mem  Self-rated memory skills 
(1: excellent,…5: poor)         2.919    0.979   
Words_mem   Immediate word listing memory test 
(0-10 words from a list of 40)
a   4.906      1.825 
 
Lhhincpc  Log household income per capita
b   9.428    0.918 
Lhhincpc_p  Prediction of Lhhincpc
c        9.427    0.535 
Lhhwltpc  Log household wealth per capita
d   10.176    3.635 
Lhhwltpc_p  Prediction of Lhhwltpc
c          10.170    1.745 
 
Notes: 
a.  Words_mem has 44 missing observations. These are set to the sample median for 
the estimations. 
b.  Log household income for singles (dmarlt=0), log (0.5*[household income]) for 
couples (dmarlt=1). 
c.  Prediction based upon regression on all the variables in the table other than 
income and wealth and on lagged log income per capita. 
d.  Log household wealth for singles (dmarlt=0), log (0.5*[household wealth]) for 
couples (dmarlt=1). 1.7% has negative wealth and 4.0% has zero wealth. In these 
cases, ln wealth is defined as –ln(-wealth) and 0, respectively. 
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4. Models with Focal Points, Selection, Acquiescence Bias, and Gating 
  In this section we will introduce some limited dependent variable models 
explaining monthly consumption and response behavior, accounting for acquiescence and 
anchoring. There are several reasons why this is useful. First, the discussion at the end of 
the previous section and the existing literature suggest that anchoring and acquiescence 
effects may vary with the deviation between the true amount and the entry point. To 
incorporate this, we need to model the complete distribution of consumption in the 
population of interest. Second, we want to know how consumption, response behavior, 
and anchoring and acquiescence vary with background variables such as age, gender, 
education level, etc. The sample is much too small to do this in a non-parametric way. 
Third, simulations on the basis of a completely specified model can be used to analyze 
how anchoring and acquiescence can bias the conclusions on the distribution of 
consumption. For given parameter estimates, the conditional distribution of consumption 
given a set of covariates x is completely known, so that we can compare estimated 
(conditional) distribution functions, means, standard deviations, etc. for models that do 
and do not allow for acquiescence and gating.     
Fourth, the parametric model will use the information in the open-ended answers 
efficiently and will lead to tests of anchoring and acquiescence with higher power than 
the non-parametric tests in van Soest and Hurd (2003). Of course this comes at the cost of 
parametric assumptions, but we hope to largely overcome this drawback by modeling the 
distribution of consumption in a flexible way.               
 
Focal Points 
Focal points are a salient feature of the open answers, in particular at $500, 
$1000, $1500 and $2000 (cf. Hurd et al., 1998, and the jumps in the cumulative 
distribution of open responses in Figure 1; see also Figure A1 in the appendix for a more 
detailed picture). Since focal points coincide with entry points, it is essential to take the 
focal points explicitly into account. A limited dependent variable model generalizing 
ordered probit and tobit is used to achieve this, modeling the open-ended answers as a 
mixed continuous discrete distribution.   14
  The observed open-ended answer y (ln consumption) is modeled as a 
transformation of an underlying latent variable y* which depends upon background 




     \ [¶ e 
(1) 
    e|x ~ N(0,se
2)  
 
The transformation is similar to ordered probit for the discrete focal point answers, but 
also allows for any answer in the intervals around the focal points. With four focal points 
ln(500), ln(1000), ln(1500) and ln(2000), the complete specification is as follows: 
 
If y* £ m1:      y=y* 
If m1 < y* £ m2:   y=ln(500) 
If m2 < y* £ m3:   y=ln(500) + (ln(1000) – ln(500)) (y*- m2) /(m3 - m2)  
If m3 < y* £ m4:   y=ln(1000) 
(2)  If m4 < y* £ m5:   y=ln(1000) + (ln(1500) –ln(1000)) (y*- m4) /(m5 – m4)   
If m5 < y* £ m6:  y=ln(1500) 
If m6 < y* £ m7   y=ln(1500) + (ln(2000) – ln(1500)) (y*- m6) /(m7 – m6)  
If m7 < y* £ m8:  y=ln(2000) 
If y* > m8:    y=y* 
 
It is easy to see that this model specializes to a standard linear regression model with 
normally distributed errors and without focal points if m1 = m2 = ln(500), m3 = m4 = 
ln(1000), m5 = m6 = ln(1500), and m7 = m8 = ln(2000). This also shows that the 
specification is much more flexible than a linear regression model. The ordered probit 
model with focal points only is the other extreme special case; it arises if - P1 < m2 = 
m3 < m4 = m5  < m6 = m7 < m8 = ,QJHQHUDO\LVMXVWDWRROWRFUHDWHDIOH[LEOHPL[HG
                                                 
9 The index indicating the respondent is suppressed throughout.   15
discrete-continuous distribution of y (given background variables x) using well-known 
limited dependent variable techniques. It is not necessary to interpret y* as a true 
underlying consumption value and the transformation from y* to y does not have 
anything to do with rounding. In the end, we are interested in the distribution of y and not 
in the distribution of y*.
10         
  In the sequel, the category thresholds m1 and m8 are normalized at values ln(500) 
and ln(2000), respectively. This excludes the special case with focal points only. Since 
the reported open answers in the data do not only contain focal points, and in particular 
also contain values below 500 and above 2000, this loss of generality is harmless for the 
data at hand. 
   
Selective Response Behavior at Open-Ended Questions 
A standard selection equation is used to explain whether respondents in sample I 
who first get an open-ended question, give an open-ended answer or choose to answer the 
first bracket question. (As explained before, respondents who neither give an open 
answer, nor answer the first bracket question, are discarded in the analysis.)  The 
selection equation is specified as follows: 
 
     V [¶ X 
(3)    s* 0:  open-ended answer  
s*<0:   bracket answer 
 
The error term u and the error term e in the main equation (1) are assumed to be jointly 
normal and independent of background variables x: 
 
    u,e|x ~ N2¶  
 
                                                 
10 A more structural approach is followed by Battistin et al. (2000). They model focal points and the true 
distribution of consumption using a mixture of several rounding procedures. They identify their model 
using a second data set with non-rounded (diary based) consumption amounts and do not address non-
response or bracket response. Both the nature of our data and our focus on non-response and biases in 
bracket answers make this approach infeasible in our context.    16
+HUH LVQRUPDOL]HGWR  se
2
DQG   se. If in case of an open-ended 
answer, y* were observed rather than y, and the information in the bracket answers would 
not be used, then this would give the standard Heckman seOHFWLRQPRGHO,I  – (2) 
could be estimated consistently using the observations on open-ended answers only and 
LJQRULQJWKHVHOHFWLRQPHFKDQLVP,QJHQHUDOIRUXQNQRZQ LWZRXOGVWLOOEHSRVVLEOHWR
estimate (1) – (3) without using any information on either the follow-up bracket answers 
in sample I or the immediate bracket answers in sample II, but identification would then 
rely on exclusion restrictions in (1) or on functional form assumptions. Using bracket 
information will help to identify the model non-parametrically, but account has to be 
taken of gating and/or acquiescence bias. 
  The bracket question is formulated as: “Is the amount E or more?” Without gating 
or acquiescence bias, the probability of an answer “yes” for a forced bracket respondent 
in sample II is given by: 
 
  P[“yes” | x] = P[y ³ ln E | x] = P[y* ³ m(E) | x] = P[e ³ m(E) –[¶ _[@  
(4) 
= F>[¶ – m(E))/se] 
 
where m(500) = m1, m(1000) = m3, m(1500) = m5, m(2000) = m7 and m(5000) = 
ln(5000). The discrete nature of the consumption answers is fully taken into account here; 
if the question would have been “Is the amount more than E?” then m(500)  would have 
been taken equal to m2, etc. 
    For follow-up bracket respondents, similar expressions are obtained, but now 
conditional probabilities are needed, given selection into the unfolding brackets: 
 
  P[“yes” | x, s*<0] =  P[y ³ ln E | x, s*<0] = P[y* ³ m(E) | x, s*<0] =  
(5) 
= P[e ³ m(E) –[¶ _[X-[¶ @  
 
= P[e ³ m(E) –[¶ DQGX-[¶ _[@3>X-[¶ _[@ 
   17
Acquiescence 
Let us first introduce acquiescence bias, assuming that there is no gating. 
Acquiescence bias or “yea-saying” implies that some respondents incorrectly answer 
“yes.” One way of allowing for acquiescence bias is to assume that with probability 
P(Acq|x) = F[¶ EUDFNHWUHVSRQGHQWVDQVZHU³\HV´LUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHWUXHYDOXHRUWKH
entry point. This is the “fixed” acquiescence probability model of Kanninen (1995) and 
van Soest and Hurd (2003), where the acquiescence probability is allowed to vary with 
exogenous variables x (but is fixed in the sense that it does not vary with y or E, 
conditional on x). 
  As argued above already, this model may be too restrictive. Results of Hurd 
(1999) imply that acquiescence bias increases with uncertainty. This is also suggested by 
our comparison of close to median income households with far from median income 
households at the end of the previous section (although that analysis did not control for 
x). It implies that, for a given respondent, the probability of an incorrect “yes” answer 
should be larger if the true value is close to the entry point than if it is far below the entry 
point. To take this into account, acquiescence bias is introduced as follows, using a 
(respondent specific) acquiescence parameter A that is added to y* before the comparison 
with m(E) is made: 
 
  P[“yes” | x, A] = P[ y* + A ³ m(E) | x, A] =  
(6) 
= F>[¶ $– m(E))/se] 
 
The acquiescence bias (for given x and A) is then given by the difference between (6) and 
(4). To interpret this, note that for small values of A, this bias can be approximated by 
 
  A 1/se  >[¶ – m(E))/se] 
 
Thus the acquiescence bias depends on the parameter A as well as on the probability 
density around the threshold m(E). If E is a focal point, this refers to the number of 
respondents who are on the borderline between having consumption smaller than E or   18
consumption equal to E. If E is not a focal point, it refers to borderline respondents with 
consumption close to E. 
  Not all answers will be contaminated by acquiescence bias. It seems reasonable to 
assume that the parameter A varies with observed and unobserved respondent 
characteristics. Two distributions of A will be considered. The first is a normal 
distribution, in line with the other distributional assumptions made above:  
 
(7a)  $_[a1[¶ H[S[¶ 
2 ), independent of e and u 
 
The second explicitly imposes that the acquiescence bias has to be nonnegative and uses 
a censored normal, with censoring from below at zero:
11 
 
(7b)  $_[a&1[¶ H[S[¶ 
2; 0) 
 
The assumption that A is independent of e and u could be criticized. While it seems 
reasonable to assume that A is not affected by the true consumption level, it might be the 
case that the size of the acquiescence bias is related to the tendency not to answer the 
open-ended question (for sample I). In particular, if not answering the open-ended 
question is related to uncertainty rather than privacy concerns, uncertainty could drive 
both response behavior and acquiescence bias. With the data at hand, it seems too 
ambitious to try and identify a (negative) correlation between u and A that could reflect 
this. Hopefully, it is picked up by some of the background variables in x (such as the 
financial respondent dummy or the indicators of memory skills). 
 
Gating 
As for acquiescence, two types of models are considered: one with a “fixed” 
gating probability P(Gat|x)=F[¶ IL[HGLQWKHVHQVe that it does not depend upon y or 
E) and one in which gating varies with the distance between the entry point and the true 
amount.  
                                                 
11 z~CN(m,s
2,0) if z=max(0,z*) with z*~N(m,s
2).   19
Combining fixed gating with the model incorporating acquiescence bias along the lines 
discussed above gives the following probabilities for answering “yes” to a bracket 
question, conditional upon x and the acquiescence parameter A: 
 
P[“yes” | x, A] =  
(8)  = P[ y* + A ³ m(E) | x, A] (1-P(Gat)) + P[ y* + A < m(E) | x, A] P(Gat)  = 
= F>[¶ $– m(E))/se](1-F[¶ -F>[¶ $– m(E))/se])F[¶  
 
Bivariate probabilities incorporating the decision not to answer the open-ended question 
can be constructed in the same way. 
  An alternative is that the probability of gating falls with the distance between E 
and Y. This can formally be introduced in a similar way as acquiescence bias but has a 
different interpretation. The “gating error” G will be drawn from a symmetric distribution 
around 0, leading to incorrect classifications in both directions. Following Hurd et al. 
(1998), but accounting for focal answers and for acquiescence bias in line with the rest of 
the model, this leads to the following assumptions, generalizing (6): 
 
  P[“yes” | x, A] = P[ y* + A + G  ³ m(E) | x, A]  
 
  G|x ~ N(H[S[¶ 
2);  G is independent of A, u and e   
 
The normality assumptions allow for an analytical expression of the probability of a 
“yes” under gating, conditional on the acquiescence parameter: 
 
(9)  P[“yes” | x, A] =  F>[¶ $– m(E))/¥se 




For small sG  H[S[¶ WKHJDWLQJELDVLHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHSUREDELOLWLHVLQ
(9) and (6), can be approximated by 
 




 >[¶ $– m(E))/se@[¶ $– m(E)) /se 
    20
This shows that gating reduces probabilities larger WKDQLHFDVHVZLWK[¶ $– 
P(!DQGLQFUHDVHVSUREDELOLWLHVOHVVWKDQLH[¶ $– m(E)<0), corresponding 
to the notion that gating increases the probabilities of the tail outcomes. Moreover, the 
size of the gating effect depends on the relative importance of gating versus genuine 
unobserved heterogeneity in y*, on the probability density of borderline consumption 
values (accounting for acquiescence), and on the distance of the entry point to the mean 
of the distribution (i.e., the deviDWLRQIURPV\PPHWU\$ODUJHQHJDWLYHYDOXHRI[¶ 
LPSOLHVQRJDWLQJWKHJDWLQJSUREDELOLW\LQFUHDVHVZLWK[¶ 7KHDVVXPSWLRQVDERXW
gating and acquiescence bias are similar. In particular, we assume that the gating effect is 
independent of u, implying that gating effects are similar for follow-up bracket 
respondents and for forced bracket respondents with the same x and y*. The fact that, on 
average, follow-up bracket respondents may be more uncertain than forced bracket 
respondents, and therefore may be more affected by gating, is taken into account through 
observed characteristics x only. 
 
Identification and Estimation 
Acquiescence and gating enter the model in a similar way; only the distribution of 
the sum of A and G will be identified. Combining (7b) with (9) gives an asymmetric 
distribution for G+A, which is a mixture of a censored normal and a normal. The model 
will be identified due to the asymmetry. Combining (7a) with (9) gives a distribution of 
*$WKDWLVV\PPHWULFDURXQG[¶ $OWKRXJKLGHQWLIication is still guaranteed due to the 
functional form of the variance, this seems infeasible in practice. Instead, we will not try 
to disentangle G and A for this specification, and replace (7a) and (9) by 
 
  *$_[a1[¶ H[S[¶ 
2) 
        
  The model can be estimated by maximum likelihood. For those who answer the 
open-ended question, the likelihood contribution is the product of a univariate normal 
density and a univariate normal (selection) probability (non-focal points), or a bivariate 
normal probability (focal points). For follow-up bracket respondents, the likelihood can 
be written as a function of univariate, bivariate and trivariate normal probabilities. The   21
latter can be obtained by numerical integration. For the forced bracket respondents in 





Likelihood values of several competing model specifications are presented in 
Table 2. The table also contains the value of the Akaike Information Criterion of each 
model (AIC; minus 2 times the log likelihood plus 2 times the number of parameters).  
  The first model (M1; the benchmark model) has no gating or acquiescence. The 
second model has fixed gating and acquiescence probabilities that are not allowed to vary 
with individual characteristics x. This model is already a substantial improvement 
compared to the benchmark model in terms of likelihood and AIC. This is mainly due to 
the acquiescence probability which has a point estimate of about 0.05, while the 
estimated gating probability is only 0.01. Models M3, M4 and M5 allow for “fixed” 
gating and/or acquiescence probabilities that vary with background variables x (but not 
with y or E, given x). The model with both acquiescence and gating outperforms the 
benchmark model and the models with either fixed probability gating or fixed probability 
acquiescence.
12  
Models M6 – M9 allow for gating and/or acquiescence based upon the normal 
distribution in (7a). These models perform worse in terms of AIC than the fixed 
probability models M2-M5 and will be discarded in the sequel. Models M10 and M11 
allow for censored normal acquiescence as in (7b) but not for gating.  Model M11 
outperforms all models with fixed probability gating and acquiescence. In terms of AIC, 
it also outperforms the more flexible models which allow for a normally distributed 
gating error in addition to the censored normal acquiescence error, giving a mixture 
distribution of the total term driving response error, A+G (M12 and M13). Apparently, 
allowing for a normally distributed gating effect is not necessary once acquiescence is 
controlled for in a flexible way. Of course this may also reflect an identification problem, 
                                                 
12 Moreover, models M3 and M4 outperform their simplified versions in which the gating or acquiescence 
probability does not vary with x, both in terms of AIC and according to a likelihood ratio test.   22
since identifying the mixture distribution from the bracket answers and their deviations 
from open-ended answers is difficult in practice. 
 
Table 2. Log likelihood and AIC values of several models 
 
Model            Log likelihood   (# parameters)    AIC 
 
No gating or acquiescence: 
M1.  A=0, G=0          -5344.34  (22)  10732.7 
 
Fixed gating and/or acquiescence probabilities: 
M2.  3*DW_[  03$FT_[  0      -5281.53  (24)  10611.1 
M3.  P(Gat|x)=F[¶ 3$FT_[      -5277.35  (31)  10616.7 
M4.  P(Gat|x)=0, P(Acq|x)=F[¶      -5277.38  (31)  10616.8 
M5.  P(Gat|x)=F[¶ 3$FT_[ F[¶     -5265.21  (40)
 13  10610.4 
 
Varying gating and/or acquiescence probabilities:  
Normal distribution: 
M6.  $ *a1H[S[¶ 
2)      -5294.96  (31)  10651.9 
M7.  $*a1 0 0)         -5299.66  (24)  10647.3 
M8.  $*a1[¶ s
2)        -5299.20  (32)  10662.4 
M9.  $*a1[¶ H[S[¶ 
2)      -5273.61  (40)  10627.2 
Censored Normal: 
M10.  A~TN[¶ s
2; 0), G=0      -5275.47  (32)  10614.9 
M11.  $a71[¶ H[S[¶ 
2; 0), G=0    -5257.59  (40)  10595.2 
Mixtures: 
M12.  $a71[¶ s
2
*a1H[S[¶ 
2)   -5272.24  (41)  10626.5 
M13.  $a71[¶ H[S[¶ 
2
*a1H[S[¶ 
2) -5252.87  (49)
14  10603.7 
 
Fixed gating, varying acquiescence: 
M14.   $a71[¶ H[S[¶ 
2
3*DW_[  0  -5256.60  (41)  10595.2 
M15.  $a71[¶ H[S[¶ 
2; 0), P(Gat|x)=F[¶   -5249.80  (49)




Finally, since among the models allowing for gating but not for acquiescence bias, 
the “fixed” gating probability model (model M3 in Table 2) performed better than the 
model in which the gating probability depends upon the deviation between true value and 
entry point, while the reverse is found comparing models that allow for acquiescence 




3DUDPHWHUVLQ RQGXPPLHVVPRNHUDQGQRQ-drinker converged to - 
15
3DUDPHWHULQ RQGXPP\VPRNHUFRQYHUJHGWR-   23
only, we have estimated mixed versions in which gating is incorporated with a fixed 
probability but acquiescence is incorporated with a varying probability through a 
censored normal acquiescence term. This is the model given by (6) and (7b) extended 
with fixed probability gating. That is, in model M15, the probability of a “yes” is given 
by (8) and in model M14 the gating probability is restricted to be a constant, i.e., P(Gat) = 
0 instead of P(Gat)=F[¶ ,QPRGHO0WKHHVWLPDWHGJDWLQJSUREDELOLW\LVIn 
terms of AIC, models M11 and M14 perform equally well. Both outperform the more 
general model M15. In this model, the coefficient on the dummy for smokers converges 
to -LPSO\LQJWKDWIRUVPRNHUVWKHJDWLQJHIIHFWLV]HUR7KHRQO\RWKHUVLJQLILFDQW
coefficient in the gating probability is the dummy for drinking alcohol (positive with t-
value 1.98).   
 
Parameter Estimates 
In the remainder we will focus on four models: the benchmark model without 
gating or acquiescence bias (M1 in Table 2, denoted model 1 from now on), the best 
model with gating only, i.e., the fixed probability gating model (model 2 from now on; 
M3 in Table 2), the model with censored normal acquiescence bias and no gating (from 
now on model 3; M11 in Table 2), and the other model with the lowest AIC value which 
has censored normal acquiescence and fixed probability gating independent of the 
regressors (model 4 from now on; M14 in Table 2). Table 3 presents the parameter 
estimates for these four models. 
From an economic point of view, the consumption equation is the most interesting, 
since this gives the underlying distribution of consumption in the population (conditional 
on x), corrected for selective response behavior and, in models 2, 3 and 4, potential biases 
in bracket answers. The signs of the significant slope coefficients in the consumption 
equation are the same for all four models, and significance levels are also similar. There 
are some changes in the size of the slope coefficients but most of these are small.
16 
                                                 
16 The coefficients are the estimated marginal effects of changing the regressor on y*.  Due to the 
nonlinearity of the transformation from y* to y, the marginal effects on y vary across observations. Because 
of the chosen normalization, however, they are similar to the marginal effects on y*, on average. For 
example, for model 4, additional computations show that, on average over all the observations, the 
marginal effects on y are 1.023 times as large as the marginal effects on y*.  The marginal effects on y for 
each individual observation are in between 0.978 and 1.036 times the marginal effect on y*.         24
Table 3. Estimation Results Selected Models 
 
                   Model 1         Model 2            Model 3           Model 4 
log likelihood    -5344.34        -5277.38           -5257.59          -5238.60 
  























constant        1.802*  0.235   1.283*  0.232      1.639*  0.240      1.592*   0.238 
0.01*bthyr      0.762*  0.224   0.710*  0.221      0.637*  0.250      0.682*   0.254 
marr lt         0.297*  0.029   0.309*  0.028      0.306*  0.029      0.312*   0.030 
logincome pc    0.506*  0.038   0.554*  0.037      0.508*  0.039      0.516*   0.038 
logwealth pc    0.006   0.015   0.010   0.015      0.008   0.015      0.007    0.015 
sig e      0.679*  0.009   0.618*  0.009      0.615*  0.010      0.611*   0.010 
Thresholds 
m1 (log 500)    6.215           6.251              6.251              6.251 
m2              6.397*  0.015   6.394*  0.014      6.390*  0.014      6.391*   0.014 
m3              6.830*  0.018   6.816*  0.018      6.807*  0.018      6.810*   0.018 
m4              7.080*  0.019   7.064*  0.019      7.055*  0.019      7.057*   0.019 
m5              7.240*  0.018   7.225*  0.019      7.218*  0.019      7.219*   0.019 
m6              7.357*  0.016   7.346*  0.017      7.341*  0.017      7.343*   0.017 
m7              7.426*  0.015   7.416*  0.016      7.415*  0.016      7.416*   0.016 
m8 (log 2000)   7.601           7.601              7.601              7.601  
Selection (
￿ ) 
constant        0.181   0.173   0.200   0.173      0.240#  0.174      0.234#   0.174 
dnonfinr       -0.238*  0.067  -0.240*  0.068     -0.231*  0.068     -0.233*   0.068 
d man           0.221*  0.062   0.220*  0.062      0.217*  0.062      0.218*   0.062 
0.01*bthyr      0.044   0.495   0.053   0.496      0.106   0.497      0.099    0.497 
0.01*yrsed      1.608+  0.926   1.498+  0.929      1.027   0.935      1.106    0.935 
d smokes        0.120   0.099   0.120   0.099      0.096   0.101      0.100    0.101 
d drinks        0.044   0.062   0.041   0.062      0.045   0.062      0.044    0.062 
self_mem       -0.078*  0.030  -0.077*  0.030     -0.076*  0.030     -0.076*   0.030 
word_mem        0.052*  0.018   0.052*  0.018      0.053*  0.018      0.053*   0.018 
r(u,e)      -0.161*  0.037  -0.139*  0.042      0.065   0.052      0.034    0.060 
Gating (
￿ )                P(Gat) (%) 
constant                       -1.149*  0.458                         1.542+   0.926  
dnonfinr                       -0.265#  0.206                        
d man                          -0.165   0.168                        
0.01*bthyr                     -0.039   1.437                        
0.01*yrsed                     -2.530   2.054                        
d smokes                       -0.392   0.320                       
d drinks                        0.259#  0.166                       
self_mem                        0.058   0.086                         
























constant                                          -5.091*  1.367     -4.206*   2.202 
dnonfinr                                           0.801#  0.333      0.555+   0.330 
d man                                              0.409#  0.286      0.300    0.236 
0.01*bthyr                                         1.163   2.222      0.107    1.848 
0.01*yrsed                                        20.555*  5.816     18.245*   8.051 
d smokes                                          -0.290   0.559     -0.225    0.464 
d drinks                                           0.372#  0.240      0.251    0.219 
self_mem                                           0.011   0.125      0.034    0.099 
word_mem                                           0.145*  0.077      0.114    0.078 
Acquiescence (
￿ ) 
constant                                           2.042*  0.432      1.910*   0.561 
dnonfinr                                          -0.644*  0.226     -0.742*   0.374 
d man                                             -0.195#  0.148     -0.177    0.187 
0.01*bthyr                                         0.146   1.302      0.206    1.520 
0.01*yrsed                                        -8.185*  2.158     -8.351*   2.407 
d smokes                                          -0.061   0.242     -0.062    0.281 
d drinks                                          -0.019   0.149     -0.001    0.178 
self_mem                                           0.024   0.080      0.006    0.088 
word_mem                                          -0.118*  0.042     -0.149*   0.056 
 
Notes:  * |t-value|>1.96; +: 1.96>|t-value|>1.64; #: 1.64>|t-value|>1.28 
Model 1: no gating, no acquiescence bias (M1 in Table 2) 
Model 2: fixed probability gating (M3 in Table 2) 
Model 3: Acquiescence term censored normal (M11 in Table 2) 
Model 4: Acquiescence and gating (M15 in Table 2)    25
Most variables are significant and have the expected sign. Consumption increases 
with year of birth, i.e., falls with age. It is larger for couples (dmarlt=1) than for singles, 
keeping per capita income constant. If instead total household income would be kept 
constant, then couples would consume slightly less than singles. The estimated income 
elasticity (keeping other variables constant) varies between 0.506 and 0.554. There is no 
explicit distinction between transitory and permanent income here, but for this sample of 
elderly households, transitory income will be of minor importance. For specifications in 
which we did not take account of measurement error and directly included observed 
household income, the estimated income elasticity varied between 0.10 and 0.16, clearly 
illustrating the downward attenuation bias due to measurement error. For specifications 
that predict household income without using lagged income as one of the instruments, we 
found still larger income elasticities in the order of magnitude close to one, but with 
much larger standard errors and with an implausible significantly negative elasticity of 
consumption with respect to total household wealth. We have therefore chosen to present 
the models which use lagged household income as one of the predictors of household 
income, and the estimated income elasticity can be interpreted as a lower bound on the 
true elasticity if a time persistent measurement error still leads to a downward attenuation 
bias.
17 This bias will be much smaller than the attenuation bias if income itself is included 
as a regressor. 
The wealth elasticity is essentially zero and not significant. This elasticity appears 
to vary across specifications in the direction opposite to the income elasticity. It is 
significantly positive if measurement error is not taken into account. 
The slope coefficients in the selection equation indicating whether an open-ended 
answer is given are also similar for the four specifications.  Financial respondents are 
significantly more likely to give an open-ended answer than others, in line with the 
notion that financial respondents have less uncertainty about the household’s total 
consumption level. Men are significantly and substantially more likely to give an open-
ended answer than women. Since gender will appear to play no role in the acquiescence 
or gating effects, this will probably not be due to differences in financial knowledge. It 
                                                 
17 The results concerning selective non-response to the open-ended consumption question and for anchoring 
and acquiescence bias are qualitatively similar if log income and log wealth are included themselves 
instead of their predicted values.   26
might mean that men are less concerned about privacy or confidentiality issues than 
women.  
Education hardly plays a role. Age, smoking, or drinking, do not play any role 
either. The effects of the two indicators for memory skills are significant and have the 
expected sign: people with a better memory – either self-reported or according to the 
word listing test – are more likely to give an open-ended response. The magnitude of the 
difference is substantial. On average, someone at the first quartile of both memory skills 
indicators is about 10 percentage-points less likely to give an open-ended answer than 
someone at the third quartile. 
  The only selection parameter that changes substantially if acquiescence or gating 
LVDOORZHGIRULVWKHFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQW EHWZHHQWKHHUURUWHUPVe and u in 
consumption and response equations. While this parameter is significantly negative in 
models 1 and 2, it is positive in model 3, although not significant, and negative and not 
significant in model 4. Allowing for acquiescence bias causes the switch, gating is not 
important here (modeOVDQGJLYHDVLPLODU DVZHOODVPRGHOVDQG7KHLQWXLWLRQ
for this result is clear. Taken at face value, bracket reports imply higher consumption 
levels than open-ended answers (cf. Figure 3). Without acquiescence bias, this has to be 
attributHGWRVHOHFWLRQ7KLVOHDGVWRWKHQHJDWLYHHVWLPDWHIRU LQPRGHOVDQGWKRVH
who give the open-ended answers tend to be the people with lower consumption 
(negative selection into open-ended answers). In models 3 and 4, however, yea-saying 
can explain why the bracket answers imply so many high consumption levels. Selection 
effects can then explain differences between forced bracket answers and follow-up 
bracket answers, if any. The follow up bracket respondents report similar consumption 
levels as the direct bracket respondents (see Figure 3). Intuitively, this explains why 
models 3 and 4 do not imply a significant selection effect. This argument is not the 
complete story, since Figure 3 does not condition on background variables while the 
models in Table 3 do.  
It seems worthwhile to note here that in a selection model that discards the 
information in the bracket answers completely and uses the same specifications for the 
VHOHFWLRQDQGFRQVXPSWLRQHTXDWLRQVWKHHVWLPDWHRI LV–0.75 with t-value –16. Such a 
model thus would imply a huge negative selection effect, leading to the conclusion that   27
people with relatively low consumption levels tend to answer the open question. The 
model using the bracket information at face value gives a qualitatively similar conclusion 
but the magnitude of the selection effect is much smaller. The models that allow for 
acquiescence bias show that if there is a selection effect, it is probably of the opposite 
sign.  
In model 2, the gating probability is larger for non-financial respondents than for 
financial respondents and is larger for those who drink alcohol than for those who do not. 
Both of these effects are significant at the 20% level only, however. The latter could 
reflect something like an easy-going life style for people who drink alcohol, accompanied 
by sloppier response behavior. For smoking, we find the opposite effect, but this is not 
significant. Gating falls with years of education but this effect is insignificant also. The 
only variable that is significant at the 5% level is the objective memory test. It indicates 
that those with a better memory make fewer gating errors. The negative effects of 
memory skills, the financial respondent dummy, and years of education are in line with 
the notion that anchoring becomes more likely if people are less knowledgeable and more 
uncertain about their actual consumption level.
18  
  $FTXLHVFHQFHGHSHQGVRQWKHUHJUHVVRUVWKURXJK DVZHOODV :KHWKHUD
regressor has a significant effect on acquiescence thus depends on whether the two 
FRHIILFLHQWVRQWKLVUHJUHVVRULQ DQG DUHMRLQWO\VLJQLILFDQW,QPRGHO:DOGWHVWV
show that the dummy for non-financial respondents, years of education, and the words 
listing memory skills test are significant at the 5% level.  The dummy for drinking 
alcohol is significant at the 14.4% level, other variables are insignificant even at the 20% 
level. The results for model 4 are similar, but the drinking dummy is insignificant at the 
20% level and the non-financial respondent dummy is significant at the 5.3% level only.    
  One way to interpret the acquiescence parameters in models 3 and 4 is to look at 
the effect of the regressors on the expected value of the acquiescence parameter A. It is 
straightforward to show that this is given by 
                                                 
18 When other variables such as income and wealth are included, these also are insignificant at 
even the 20% level.  
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Thus the marginal effects on the acquiescence parameter vary across observations. If 
cRHIILFLHQWVLQ DQG KDYHWKHVDPHVLJQWKHPDUJLQDOHIIHFWDOZD\VKDVWKDWVLJQDOVR
If not, the sign of the marginal effect varies across observations. For all three variables in 
model 3 that are significant for acquiescence at the 5% level, the sign changes. Averaging 
over all the observations (or looking at the medians, which are close to the means) for 
model 3, we find that non-financial respondents are less subject to acquiescence than 
financial respondents, that years of education has a positive effect, and that respondents 
with better memory skills – as measured with the word listing test - have a smaller 
tendency of acquiescence. Only the latter finding is in line with the notion that 
acquiescence is a sign of uncertainty or lack of financial knowledge.
19 The same results 
are found for model 4. 
 
Reporting Bias 
Table 4 compares the reporting biases of models 2, 3 and 4 for two benchmark 
respondents. Both are married females of median age in a two persons household with 
household income $37,000 and total household wealth $220,000. Both are the financial 
respondent in their household and have 12 years of education.  The first benchmark 
respondent (I) has a poor score on memory test and poor self-reported memory skills; the 
second (II) has a good score on memory test and good self-reported memory skills.
20 The 
first column gives benchmark estimates for the distribution function (which is the same 
for both respondents, since memory skills are not included in the consumption equation). 
The other columns give the differences between the reported and the true probability for 
entry bracket responses, according to each of the models 2, 3 and 4. For example, model 
4 predicts that among those with characteristics of respondent I, 60.7% have consumption 
at most $1500. The question “is your family consumption more than $1500?” would be 
                                                 
19 These signs are in line with the acquiescence parameters in model M10 of Table 2, which is similar to 
model 3 but does not allow for heteroskedasticity in the underlying normal distribution of the acquiescence 
parameter. Significance levels of the acquiescence effects in this model are low, however, with only the 
objective memory test and the drinking dummy significant at the one-sided 10% level. 
20 The estimated probabilities of giving an open-ended answer are 0.595 for respondent I and 0.728 for 
respondent II.   29
answered with “no” by only 52.2% of such respondents. Only the difference between 
these numbers, 52.2-60.7=-8.5%-points, is presented in the table. This is the reporting 
bias in the estimated probability. 
In model 2, the reporting bias is due to gating only and thus by assumption 
symmetric: it is positive for probabilities less than 0.5 and negative for probabilities 
exceeding 0.5. Large biases are found at very low as well as very high consumption 
values. In model 3 the bias is always negative (or zero) since it is due to acquiescence, 
increasing the probabilities of answering “yes” and thus reducing the “no” probabilities 
that are tabulated here. The bias increases with the consumption level except at very high 
levels of consumption where the density becomes sparse. In model 4 with gating as well 
as acquiescence, the bias can be positive or negative for probabilities less than 0.5 and is 
always negative for probabilities larger than 0.5. 
 
 
Table 4. Reporting Bias Benchmark Respondents (percentage-points) 
 
          Respondent I      Respondent II 
 
          True   Bias   Bias   Bias     Bias   Bias   Bias 
          Mod 1  Mod 2  Mod 3  Mod 4    Mod 2  Mod 3  Mod 4 
<  250   0.5   6.2   -0.1    1.5     2.0    0.0    1.5 
<  500   5.8   5.7   -1.1    0.4     1.8   -0.7    0.8 
£  500     9.6   5.3   -1.8   -0.4     1.7   -1.2    0.3 
< 1000  25.3   3.4   -4.5   -3.6     1.1   -3.0   -1.6 
£ 1000    38.3   1.7   -6.6   -6.0     0.5   -4.2   -3.0 
< 1500  47.5   0.4   -7.9   -7.5     0.1   -4.9   -3.8 
£ 1500    54.4  -0.6   -8.8   -8.5    -0.2   -5.3   -4.2 
< 2000  58.4  -1.1   -9.2   -9.0    -0.4   -5.5   -4.5 
£ 2000    68.1  -2.5  -10.0  -10.0    -0.8   -5.7   -4.8 
< 3000  85.7  -4.8  -10.1  -10.1    -1.5   -5.1   -4.5 
< 4000  93.2  -5.6   -9.1   -9.0    -1.8   -4.0   -3.7 
< 5000  96.6  -6.0   -8.0   -7.8    -1.9   -3.1   -3.1 
 
Notes: 
Respondents I and II: woman, born in 1919, married, not smoking, not drinking, 
household income $37,000 and household wealth $220,000, financial respondent, 12 
years of education, born in 1919. Respondent 1: self-rated memory fair, word list 
memory score 3; respondent II: self-rated memory very good, word list score 7. 
  First column: true (= reported) probability according to model 1 (equal for the two 
respondents); other columns: probability of reporting minus true probability according to 
models 2,3,4.  
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    In all models, the bias is typically lower for respondent II than for 
respondent I, in line with the notion that respondent I is less knowledgeable and more 
uncertain about the consumption amount, making her more subject to reporting bias. 
Particularly in models 3 and 4, the estimated reporting bias for respondent I is sometimes 
substantial, amounting to about 10 percentage-points at consumption levels around $2000 
- $3000. Respondent II has smaller gating as well as acquiescence bias. In model 4, her 
total bias never exceeds 5 percentage-points.        
 
Distribution of Consumption 
Table 5 shows the estimates of the distribution of consumption for the same 
benchmark persons that were used in Table 4. Since the consumption equation does not 
include memory skills, the distribution is the same for the two respondents. Model 2 
implies a less dispersed distribution than Model 1, since it attributes part of the observed 
dispersion in bracket reports to gating. This suggests that estimates that ignore gating 
would over-estimate the dispersion in the conditional distribution of consumption (given 
the covariates). The differences do not seem that large, though.   
 
Table 5. Estimated Distributions for Respondents with 
                Benchmark Characteristics (%-points) 
 
        Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
<   250     0.5     0.2     0.4     0.3 
<   500     5.8     4.3     6.2     5.8 
£   500     9.6     7.6    10.6     9.9 
<  1000    25.3    22.7    28.4    27.4 
£  1000    38.3    36.5    43.3    42.3 
<  1500    47.5    46.6    53.9    52.8 
£  1500    54.4    54.4    61.7    60.7 
<  2000    58.4    58.9    66.2    65.3 
£  2000    68.1    70.0    76.4    75.6 
<  3000    85.7    88.1    91.6    91.3 
<  4000    93.2    95.0    96.8    96.6 
<  5000    96.6    97.8    98.6    98.6   
 
Notes: See Table 4 for characteristics of benchmark respondents. 
The table presents the probabilities (in %) that consumption is less than or less than or 
equal to given value according to the estimates of models 1-4. 
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Models 3 and 4 almost always give higher probabilities than model 1 for both 
benchmark respondents, with differences that can amount to 7 or 8 percentage points. 
Allowing for acquiescence means that some of the “yes” answers to the bracket questions 
reflect yea-saying rather than high consumption levels. Correcting for this leads to 
estimates of the (conditional) distribution of consumption that gives more weight to lower 
consumption levels. This is similar for models 3 and 4. The main difference between 
these two is that model 4 also corrects for the over-dispersion due to gating, and gives 
lower probabilities in particularly the left hand tail of the distribution, implying less 
dispersion than model 3. 
In Figure 4, the exercise of Table 4 is repeated for every respondent in the sample, 
and the means over the whole sample are presented. This gives estimates of the 
cumulative distribution of consumption according to the four models. Moreover, the 
estimate based upon a Heckman (1979) selection model extended with focal points that 
does not use the bracket information is also presented. As already mentioned, this 
selection model leads to a very large negative estimate of the correlation coefficient 
driving selection into giving an open-ended answer, implying that in the observed open-
ended answers, low consumption levels would be over-represented. Correcting for this 
leads to the conclusion that consumption levels in the population are much higher than as 
reflected by the open-ended answers. The mean of log consumption would be 7.0671 
(corresponding to a consumption level of $1173) with standard deviation 0.947. All 
models that account for the bracket information give smaller selection effects, implying 
smaller consumption levels for bracket respondents. 
Figure 4 shows that there is not much difference between the distributions 
according to models 1 and 2 and not much difference between models 3 and 4. 
Differences between models 1 and 2 on the one hand and models 3 and 4 on the other 
hand are more substantial. Thus accounting for acquiescence (models 3 and 4) makes 
more difference than accounting for gating (models 2 and 4). It leads to lower 
consumption values, as already explained for the benchmark respondents. This is also 
reflected in the estimated overall means of log consumption. Models 1 and 2 give means 
of 6.908 (consumption level $1000) and 6.887 ($979). Models 3 and 4 imply smaller 
means of log consumption, 6.795 ($893) and 6.808 ($905), respectively.  All models give   32
a much lower mean than the selection model, and the models allowing for acquiescence 
give lower means than those not allowing for acquiescence.    
Similar conclusions are obtained concerning the dispersion of the distribution. All 
four models imply a much lower standard deviation of log consumption than the selection 
model. Models 1 and 2 give values of 0.823 and 0.771, respectively. The difference is in 
line with the notion that gating explains part of the dispersion in observed data. Models 3 
and 4 imply very similar values of 0.744 and 0.743, respectively. An intuitive explanation 
why these values are smaller than those for models 1 and 2 is that models 3 and 4 do not 
need additional unexplained variation to explain the differences between bracket 
responses and open-ended answers. Apparently, once acquiescence is allowed for (model 
3), incorporating gating does not lead to further reduction of the estimate of the 




We have investigated the importance of gating and acquiescence bias at the entry 
point of an unfolding bracket design. Experimental data on consumption where 
respondents are randomly either first given an open-ended question on household 
consumption or immediately directed to bracket questions were used to test whether these 
phenomena are present without making any model assumptions. The main finding is that 
acquiescence bias is the main problem. Once acquiescence is taken into account, 
incorporating anchoring in the form of Hurd et al.’s (1998) gating model or a fixed gating 
probability version of that, does not further change the conclusion about the underlying 
distribution of consumption. Ignoring acquiescence, however, leads to misleading 
conclusions on the selective nature of item non-response and on the inference on the 
distribution of consumption when selective item non-response is taken into account. It 
would lead to overestimation of consumption levels and underestimation of poverty rates. 
Not incorporating bracket information at all, however, would lead to biases in the same 
direction but of a much larger magnitude, illustrating how misleading the conclusions on 
the basis of a selection model based upon a loose identification strategy can be. 
  Fortunately, acquiescence bias can at least partially be avoided by adjusting the 
wording of the questions (cf. Hurd, 1999). The bracket questions can be formulated in a   33
neutral way, asking people to choose a category rather than answering “yes” or “no”. 
This has already been implemented in the most recent waves of, for example, the Health 
and Retirement Study and AHEAD. The results of this study suggest that, with these 
improved questions, it seems reasonably safe to use the first bracket question in an 
unfolding bracket design at face value. Given the evidence in the literature that anchoring 
is a problem also in absence of acquiescence bias, this at the same time means that 
anchoring at follow up bracket questions must be taken seriously. The fixed point model 
for anchoring – or another model with Bayesian learning – in which answers to the later 
bracket questions are affected by the entry point may then be a useful tool.  
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Figure 1. Cumulative Distributions of Monthly Consumption (on logarithmic scale) 
Open-ended responses and follow-up bracket responses by entry point; sample I 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Distributions of Monthly Consumption (on logarithmic scale) 
Open-ended responses (sample I) and immediate bracket responses by entry point 
(sample II) 
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Figure 3. Cumulative Distributions of Monthly Consumption (on logarithmic scale) 
Open-ended responses (sample I); Follow-up bracket responses using entry point 
question only (sample I); 
Immediate bracket responses using entry point question only (sample II) 
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Figure 4. Aggregate Cumulative Distribution of Consumption According to Several 
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Figure A1. Histogram of Open-ended Answers 
 
The figure shows the histogram of open-ended consumption question answers of at most 
$5000 (1407 observations). The 0-5000 range is divided into 150 categories. The figure 
clearly illustrates the rounded nature of the answers, with many focal points. The most 
frequent  answers  are  1000  (205  observations),  500  (120  observations)  2000  (103 
observations) and 1500 (85 observations).   